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This report is a consolidation of work that has been done to fulfill the goals defined in the 
CERIAS Research Proposal, “Active Protocols and Agents for Information Assurance in 
Networked Enterprises “.  According to the proposal, the development of an agent system for 
information assurance will follow two stages: 
Design of active, combined task and assurance protocols 
Development of active, secure task autonomous agents 
 
Part I of the report deals with the issues involved in the design of a protocol for an agent system. 
An agent protocol is viewed as a coordination structure between agents whose design will affect 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the assurance system. Subsequently, three techniques of 
coordination are studied: organizational structures, meta-level information exchange and multi-
agent planning. It was noted in the study that the different coordination structures affect factors 
such as communication costs, adaptation of problem solving ability and the length of the 
planning horizon in the agent system. Three important criteria in the design of an agent protocol 
were also identified: communication overhead, flexibility and scalability of the system. 
 
Part II of the report introduces a new model of information assurance that is based on the 
integration of assurance functions within agents. It was hoped that such an approach would 
introduce greater confidence in the level of assurance of the information as it would be checked 
before the actual processing begins. It was also hoped that such an approach would also allows 
graceful degradation of the assurance functions when security needs at a certain time are 
determined to be non-critical. 
 
Issues that affect the successful implementation of the model are identified as processing time, 
effects on the flexibility/mobility of the system, robustness of the system against subversion, and 
scalability of the system. The effects of the proposed model on the four issues are described and 
possible solutions are suggested to overcome the shortcomings of the model. 
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In this part, the topic of coordination structures in agent systems is introduced.  This topic is 
important to our research on information assurance as it provides an overview of the various 
structures that could be implemented in our proposed system and examines the merits and 
demerits of each structure. In addition, it also helps us to further define the various criteria that 
are relevant to the design of our protocol and to encourage us to actively incorporate these 
features into our design. 
 
 
1.2. Definition of Coordination 
 
In an agent system, coordination is defined by Jennings [12] as the process in which an agent 
reasons about its  local actions and the (anticipated) actions of others to try and ensure the 
community acts in a coherent way.  Recent research on coordination protocols and production 
agents in the PRISM Lab includes Huang (1999), Rajan and Nof (1999), Huang and Nof (2000), 
and Huang et al. (2000). 
 
Coordination is important to ensure that all the necessary portions of the overall problem are 
included in the activities of at least one agent, that agents interact in a manner which permits 
their activities to be developed and integrated into an overall solution. Coordination also ensures 
that team members act in a purposeful and consistent manner and that all these objectives are 
achievable within the available and computational and resource limitations. 
 
The main reasons for the need for coordination between multiple agents can be summarized as 
below [12]: 
Because of dependencies between agent’ actions 
Because of the need to meet global constraints 
Because no individual agent has sufficient competence, resources or information to solve the 
entire problem 
Coordination structures in agent systems can be mainly classified as below 0: 
 
 
1.3. Techniques for Coordination in Agent Systems 
 
a) Organizational Structures 
 
One method of coordination among agents is through the organizational structure of the agent 
network. In the context of Distributed Artificial Intelligence systems, an organizational structure 
can be viewed as a pattern of information and control relationships between individuals. These 
control structures are responsible for designating the relative authority of the agents and for 
shaping the types of social interaction that can occur. Hence, they can provide overall 
coordination of the agents by specifying which actions an agent w ill undertake and how 5   
redundancies of tasks undertaken by different agents could be avoided. The relationships 
specified by the organizational structures provide general, long-term information about the 
agents and the communities as a whole. 
 
b) Meta-Level Information Exchange 
 
Meta-level information exchange involves agents sending each other control level information 
about their current priorities and focus.  For example, in the Distributed Vehicle Monitoring 
Testbed by Corkill 0, a network of problem solving nodes attempt to identify, locate and track 
patterns of vehicles moving through a two-dimensional space using signals detected by acoustic 
signals.  A node constantly transmits its goals and hypotheses to other nodes, which it deems to 
be interested in the information it has to provide. It also receives the goals and hypotheses of 
other nodes. The local problem solving behavior of a node is influenced by the information it 
receives from other nodes. Hence, the problem solving ability of a node is balanced by its own 
perceptions of appropriate solving ability with activities deemed important by other nodes.      
 
c) Multi-Agent Planning 
 
In the multi-agent approach to coordination, agents usually form a plan that specifies all their 
future actions and interactions with respect to achieving a particular objective. It details, before 
actual execution, the areas of search space that will be traversed and the route each agent should 
take at each decision point in t he activity. Multi-agent plans are typically built to avoid 
inconsistent or conflicting actions, particularly with respect to the consumption of scarce 
resources. 
 
For example, in the air traffic control problem taken by Cammarata [2] each aircraft (agent) 
sends the coordinator information about its intended actions. The coordinator then builds a plan 
that specifies all the actions that the other aircraft or itself should take to avoid collisions. 
 
 
1.4. Comparison of Advantages and Disadvantages of Coordination Techniques 
 
The advantages and disadvantages that are associated with the implementation of the various 
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Table 1: Comparison of Different Protocols 
 
Protocol  Advantages  Disadvantages 
Organizational Structures  Lower communication 
costs 
Provides a control 
framework that reduces the 
amount of control 
uncertainty present in an 
agent as a result of 
incomplete or erroneous 
local control information 
Increases the possibility of 
coherence in the behavior 
of the agents by providing a 
general and global strategy 
for network problem 
solving 
  
Lower flexibility in 
response to a changing task 
and hardware environment  
Fixed problem solving 
ability of agent 
Meta-Level Information 
Exchange 
Ability to strike a balance 
between the costs of 
communication and 
computation in optimally 
determining a solution and 
the disadvantages 
associated with solving the 
problem locally 
Ability of the agent to 
adapt its problem solving 
ability according to 
information and hypotheses 
transmitted by other agents 
 
Susceptible to coordination 
errors due to receipt of 
incorrect information from 
other agents 
 
Multi-Agent Planning  High reconfigurability and 
adaptability in rapidly 
changing task 
environments 
Easy extensibility of 
network to incorporate 
other agents 
Enhanced reliability and 
fault tolerance 
More communicational and 
computational resources 
required than other two 
methods 
Short time horizon 
Higher possibility of 
generating coordination 
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1.5. Relevance to Present Research 
 
According to the CERIAS Research Proposal [16], the development of the agent system will be 
done in two stages: 
 
•  Design of active, combined task and assurance protocols 
•  Development of active, secure task autonomous agents 
 
Task 1 can be viewed as essentially designing the coordination structure in which the agents will 
operate. The coordination structure of the agent system will affect the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the assurance system. Specifically, we have to consider the following issues: 
 
a) Communication Overhead 
 
Since the assurance system will be added to the normal functions of a computer system, it is 
essential that the communication overhead from the agent system be as low as possible so that 
the performance of the system will not be affected by the running of the assurance system. 
Hence, it would be expected that a coordination structure in the form of an organizational 
structure would have a lower communication overhead than a multi-agent coordination system. 
In addition, incorporation of measures to reduce the amount of data transmitted could also reduce 
communication overhead. For example, in the agent-based intrusion detection system of [1], data 
reduction is carried out so that the amount of data that is transferred from the agent to the 





Flexibility is interpreted as the ability of the system to adapt its problem solving ability in 
response to different situations. While more flexibility in a system is usually better, under certain 
circumstances, flexibility may not be an important criterion. 
 
For example, in the agent-based intrusion detection system of [1], the agents are basically 
programs that monitor for interesting events that happen in the host. They then report their 
findings to a transceiver that is at a level higher than the agents in the hierarchy. The transceivers 
reduce the data they receive from the agents and either distributes the data to other agents or to a 
higher level in the hierarchy for further process. Through such an arrangement, the individual 
agents do not have local autonomy and the transceivers, only limited autonomy. However, in this 
case, through the cascading of tasks such as data reduction, the relevant data is consolidated in 
monitors at the highest level of the hierarchy where pattern matching is carried out. The pattern 
matching procedure may be a set procedure. However, by bringing the relevant data to a higher 
level, the flexibility requirements of the system is reduced as compared to a system where the 
data is analyzed at the lowest level. 
 
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that this observation may not apply to all the functions 
within the arena of information assurance and further investigations are necessary when choosing 
the agent protocol. 8   
c) Scalability 
 
Scalability in the system is the ability of the system to accommodate new nodes as they are 
added to the system. Addition of new nodes to the networked enterprise is always possible due to 
increases in personnel or to the increase in the operations of the business. Hence, the 
coordination structure must easily accommodate new additions without requiring change to the 
whole coordination structure. Whenever possible, modifications should only be done at the 
interface between the present coordination structure and the new addition with other 
modifications in settings done centrally at a specific module/location. 
 
1.6. Future Tasks  
 
Understanding the merits and  demerits of  different coordination structures in agent systems 
allows us to design the active task and administration protocols in our assurance system more 
effectively. It also highlighted 3 issues we have to consider in designing the protocols, namely 
communication overhead, flexibility and scalability. We can further define our tasks as below: 
1.  To determine the areas of information assurance we wish to concentrate on and to define 
the protocol by focusing on the above three criteria 
2.  To further understand how the concept of an active protocol may further improve our 
model 
3.  To determine whether the protocol should be implemented as a separate layer or whether 
the assurance functions could be incorporated into the present task administration 
protocol developed in PRISM [7,8,9, 16, 17]. 
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2.  A Role Combination Model for Information Assurance in Agents 
 
 
2.1. Model of Information Processing 
 
In the CERIAS project proposal, we propose the possible integration of assurance functions into 
agents following the TQM approach [16]. This was done in comparison with traditional 
approaches to implementing assurance agents in a separate layer such as with dedicated agents 
for intrusion detection, authentication and so on. 
 
The hypothesis is that the integration of assurance functions in agents would make them more 
autonomous in their actions. This is due to their ability to combine their data handling functions 
(within the context of an information system) with security functions.  
 
In the literature on the applications of security agent architectures in [1], [7], [14], information 
security is implemented through constant monitoring of predetermined areas such as for 
signatures of intrusions [1] or vulnerabilities in the system [7]. However in our envisaged model 
of data processing as shown in Figure 1, the agent checks the assurance of the data (i.e. whether 
the data obtained is accurate and has been secured etc) before combining the data together. This 
model is similar to the one in [19], where authentication functions are incorporated into the 
agent, together with code to perform the specific task. Checks are done on the agents to ensure 
the required security levels are satisfied before processing is done. 
 
   







Validity of data not checked         Data validated before  
processing is done 
 
 
The rationale for this model is that compared to a model where assurance functions are 
implemented periodically such as a virus scanner that is set to execute once in a month, it offers 
greater confidence in the data as the quality is assured because they are carried out just before 
actual information processing takes place.  This is especially important in mission-critical task 
processing where the quality of the data to be processed has to be guaranteed. Implementation of 
this model also allows graceful degradation of the assurance functions when security needs at a 
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2.2. Scenarios where Role Combination is Justified/Unjustified 
 
The combination of assurance functions with the normal task processing functions of the agent is 
justified when: 
 
1.  Assurance functions involve security and integrity checks that are to be done on the data 
that is to be processed (that is for data that is localized). This includes virus scan, checks 
for the completeness of the data and so on. 
2.  Data used is of very critical nature, sensitive or is constantly varying, e.g. stock prices. In 
this case, the validity of the data that has to be checked before the information processing 
begins 
3.  Data was received from unreliable sources 
4.  Autonomy and flexibility in the implementation of a security policy is important. Since 
the agent has control over the range of methods to carry out assurance functions, it is able 
to flexibly implement the security policy such as deciding which functions to implement 
based on say, the nature of the processing that is to be done. If it was assessed that the 
security requirements for a certain task 1 is not as high as task 2, then task 1 may have a 
smaller range of assurance functions that needs to be carried out    
 
It is unjustified when: 
 
1.  The assurance functions are not limited to the data that is to be processed. It may for 
example involve the analysis of audit trails for the number of failed logins, user profiles 
etc over a long period of time  
2.  The assurance functions to be done are time consuming or may involve too high a 
processing overhead when carrying out the checks. In this case,  it  may be better to 
conduct the checks before the actual processing of the data 
3.  When there are many assurance functions to be carried out. In such a case, it is better to 
have a distributed form of checking rather than a serialized form of information assurance 
done by a single agent 
 
Hence, there is a need to assign certain assurance functions to agents that carry out specialized 
tasks. These agents may be used in the collection of data in intrusion detection schemes such as 
AAFID [1]. Other assurance functions may be incorporated into the agents themselves and done 
just before information processing begins. Whether the agents carry out the assurance task or not 
depends on the risks associated with carrying out the task at that time. 
 
 
2.3. Considerations in Agents with Combined Functions 
 
The merits and demerits of an assurance system incorporating agents with combined functions 
could be further investigated in the below areas: 
1.  Processing time 
2.  Flexibility/Mobility 
3.  Robustness against Subversion 
4.  Scalability of the System 11   
 
2.4. Processing Time 
 
The time that is required for the real-time assurance of data used in processing is a very 
important factor in the suggested model. Users do not want their system to slow down 
significantly because of added assurance factors due to both the decrease in efficiency and 
ergonomic factors (Irritation, decrease in real-time effect in telecommunications etc). Hence, 
there is a need to be able to incorporate adequate responsiveness to the system when running the 
suggested model. 
 
The following three steps could be carried out: 
1.  Assess the confidence level to be accorded to the assurance of the data 
2.  Based on the confidence level determined, decide on the level of assurance required 
3.  Activate the required assurance functions 
 
To assess the confidence level, risk assessment as described below could be utilized. 
 
 
2.5. Risk Assessment 
 
Risk analysis could be done on the data before the processing takes place to determine the level 
of assurance that is required and hence the assurance functions that have to be implemented. 
From [13], [15] and [18], the following useful terms could be defined: 
 
Risk Analysis  – The p rocess of identifying security risks, determining their magnitude and 
  identifying areas needing safeguards 
 
Threat             – Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to a system in the 
  form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data and/or denial of service 
 
Vulnerability    – A weakness in the physical layout, organization, procedures, personnel, 
  management, administration, hardware or software that could be exploited to 
  cause harm to an ADP system or to the enterprise in which it resides 
 
From risk analysis, threats and vulnerabilities are identified together with the risks that they pose 
to the system. In [15], threats and vulnerabilities serve as the inputs for the system. The risk 
assessment is based on the IP header component of incoming datagrams, the sub-components 
that have an impact on security issues are identified, of which one of them is the IP source 
address. Typical characteristics of the IP source address are: 
 
•  Level of trust (trusted/untrusted) 
•  Size of Network (small/medium/large) 
•  Type of source (network/host) 
•  Location (internal/external) 
 12   
The vagueness of the characteristics is modeled in fuzzy logic with the use of fuzzy sets. Each 
characteristic is then analyzed to determine how it could impact the subcomponent. An example 
of the fuzzy rules might be as below: 
 
If Source.IP is trusted, then RiskValue is decreased    
If Source.IP is trusted, then RiskValue is increased 
If Source.IP is Type_A, then RiskValue is increased 
If Source.IP is Type_B, then RiskValue is constant 
If Source.IP is Type_A, then RiskValue is decreased 
 
Inputs are mapped from the membership value to a common scale as shown in Fig. 2. The 
intermediate risk values for each characteristic calculated above is then consolidated 
mathematically to obtain a risk value for the specific sub-component. Risk values of each of the 
sub-components are then consolidated mathematically into a Global Risk Value (GRV) for the 
particular scenario.   
  





Using similar approaches to that in [15], it is expected that the appropriate assurance level can be 
determined from the GRV and the appropriate responses activated in the agent. In the example of 
[15], the risk values are divided into low, medium and high and they respectively activate the 





Flexibility/Mobility in the present context refers to the ease in which the agent can migrate from 
host to host to carry out its tasks.  Such a design paradigm  is referred to as mobile agent 
architecture. 
 
In [6], the term “mobile agent” is used by the distributed system community to define a software 
component that is able to move among different execution environments. This is usually used in 
the artificial intelligence community in corporation with the view of an intelligent agent that is 
able to achieve a goal by performing actions and reacting to events in a dynamic environment 
[6]. 
  
Some of the advantages of achieving mobility through a mobile agent paradigm can be listed as 
below: 
 
a) Overcoming Network Latency 
 
Although a central controller can send messages to the nodes within the network and issue 
instructions on how to respond to certain scenarios, such an approach may become problematic 
when it has to respond to a certain number of events in addition to its normal processing load or 
when communication links are unreliable, leading to unacceptable delays. For a mobile agent 
paradigm, the response to a situation could be autonomously determined and executed by the 
agent, hence reducing such delays. 
 
b) Reducing Amount of Data Transferred 
 
Since mobile agents possess the methods required to process a task, they can filter the data from 
the host in which it is resident and perform the computations on the host instead of the home 
platform. Hence, there will be no need for the transfer of large amounts of data across a network 
for local processing. The situation is especially advantageous when the agent to be transferred is 
smaller in size than the data to be transferred. 
  
c) Asynchronous Execution and Autonomy 
 
A property of a mobile agent network is that it can continue to function even in the event of a 
failure of the central controller or communication links. This is due to the ability of the agent to 
operate autonomously after it is launched from a home platform. Consequently, the agent can 
continue to fulfill its task processing functions in the event of an attack on the central controller 
on when communication links fail.    
 
d) Adapting Dynamically 
 
Mobile agents provide a versatile and adaptive computing paradigm as they can be retracted, 
dispatched, cloned or put to sleep as network and host conditions change. In addition, they can 14   
also sense their execution environment and autonomously react to changes. Mobile agents can 
for example, sense the computational load on a host and if it is too high, move to another host 
with a lower utility. They can also distribute among the hosts in the network in such a way as to 
maintain the optimal configuration for solving a problem. 
    
e) Robust and Fault Tolerant Behavior 
 
The ability of mobile agents to react dynamically to unfavorable situations makes it easier to 
build robust distributed systems. In addition, the support provided for disconnected operations 
and distributed design paradigms eliminates single point of failure problems and allows them to 
provide fault-tolerant characteristics.   
 
 
However, with the incorporation of assurance functions into the agents, the code size of the 
agents is expected to increase due to extra code for assurance functions. Hence, transmission of 
the agent to another host would require a longer time. In addition, the transfer would also result 
in greater computing and network resources. Mobility of the agents will hence be restricted. 
 
A possible solution is to have all nodes in the network install an agent platform that will host the 
assurance functions that are required by the mobile agents as they migrate from one host to 
another. In such a case, the migrating agents will only carry the minimum code that decides the 
type of assurance that will be carried out at the host based on a risk assessment of the data and 
the security scene at that moment. The relevant functions are  then invoked from the agent 
platform at the target host.  The disadvantages of such an approach are: 
1.  If the agent platform centralizes all or a large part of the assurance functions that are 
required by the agent, it defeats the purpose of the distributing assurance in agents to 
reduce an attack on the assurance component of the information system (as discussed in 
Robustness against Subversion) 
2.  If different agent platforms are implemented on different networks, there is a difficulty to 
ensure that the assurance functions that are provided by a different network can fulfill the 
degree of assurance that is required by the initiator 
3.  If the same agent platform is to be implemented in all networks, there would be 
difficulties in getting the security community to agree on common standards 
 
 
2.7. Robustness against Subversion 
 
With the proposed model, it is expected that the robustness of the system against malicious 
attacks will be increased. This is because in the proposed model, there is no clear target that 
could be subverted in the event of an attack on the system. To illustrate the point, a comparison 
is made with the AAFID intrusion detection system described in [1]. In AAFID, the monitor is a 
single point of failure as it is the entity that receives the data from the tranceivers and agents 
beneath it and does high-level analysis of the data. Furthermore, existence of reliable 
communication paths between the monitor and the entities it controls is also important for the 
proper functioning of the intrusion detection system. Hence an attack on the monitor(s) or the 
communication links would effectively decapitate the entire intrusion detection system. 15   
However, in the proposed model, there is no centralized target for attack as the assurance 
functions are distributed among all agents. In addition, for the case of mobile agents that are 
residing on another host, it may also be programmed to take an alternative route back to the 
home platform when a communication link is made unavailable. Hence subversion of the system 
becomes more difficult. 
 
Furthermore, the design of the agents employed in task processing may also vary from network 
to network. There may be differences in the way the risk of accepting the data is assessed, the 
types of assurance functions deployed and the working of particular assurance functions. Hence, 
the variability in the agents also serves as a deterrent to attackers and hampers the creation of an 
action plan to subvert the system. 
 
 
2.8. The Scalability of the System  
 
Scalability of the system refers to the ease of adding new nodes to the system. A centralized 
approach to security such as a security server that handles all requests for virus scans on data 
suffers from an inability to meet rising demands for service as the number of nodes in the 
network increases and or when periodic increases in workload is experienced. Hence, there is a 
limit to the number of nodes that could be added to the system because each new addition would 
increase the computational load on the server. An incorporation of assurance functions into the 
agents would distribute the computational load.  
 
In addition, if the agents are mobile as well, execution of the information assurance could be 
carried out in the target host, hence reducing the load on the home platform. Alternatively, the 
agent could be designed to detect the utility of the target host at the moment of its residence. If it 
is determined that the utility of the host is too high, then the agent might migrate to another 
trusted host with the data that that it has obtained. The assurance functions are then executed on 
the new host using its computational resources and the results transferred back to the home 
platform. (Fig. 3) 
 
       
2.9. Future Tasks 
 
From the discussions above, it can be seen that the proposed model has certain shortcomings 
such as the limitations in the mobility of the agents due to its increased code size. However, the 
model also promises a higher level of information assurance through checking just before actual 
information processing begins.  
 
Future tasks include: 
 
a)  An investigation of the assurance functions to determine which functions are suitable for 
incorporation into the agents and which functions are better carried out by specialized 
units in the system 
b)  Actual design of the agent system using the proposed model.  The design would include 
the determination of the protocol that coordinates the actions of the agents in the system, 16   
specification of communication methods between agents and the various assurance 
functions that are to be incorporated. In addition, if mobile agents are to be used, then 
appropriate measures of security has to be devised for the agents as they migrate from 
host to host. 
c)  Implementation of the agent system on the PRISM lab’s parallel computer, Team 
Integration Evaluator. Experience accumulated during previous work done in the lab on 
autonomous agents for manufacturing [7, 8, 9] would be utilized at this stage. 
 
 
Figure 3: Movement of agent from home platform to host 1 and 2 for data collection and   
information assurance  
Home Platform 
Host 1  Host 2 
A 
A 
Step 3: Return to home platform 
Home Platform 
A 
Host 1  Host 2 
A 
Step 1: Migration to host 1 for collection 
of information 
Home Platform 
Host 1  Host 2 
A  A 
Step 2: Movement to host 2 for 
information assurance 17   
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Appendix - A Summary of the Application of Agents in Computer Security  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The application of agent technology in computer security is becoming more pronounced in the 
last few years. The  objective of this summary is to give the reader an idea of how agent 
technology was applied in various aspects of computer security. The role of agents in security 
range from the detection of  intrusions in a computer system [1], [14] to  an authorization 
architecture in [19]. 
 
2.  AAFID – A Agent-based Intrusion Detection System [1] 
 
AAFID or Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection  [1]  is an architecture for building 
intrusion detection systems (IDS)  that uses agents as their lowest-level element for data 
collection and analysis. It employs a hierarchical structure of agents, tranceivers and monitors 
that may be distributed over any number of hosts in a network. The network is shown in Fig 4.  
 
Fig 4: AAFID system architecture 
(a) Physical Layout in a sample AAFID system, showing agents, tranceivers and monitors, as 
well as the communication and control channels between them 
 
(b) Logic organization of the AAFID system 20   
 
Agents monitor for interesting events occurring in a host and report their observations to a single 
tranceiver.  The tranceiver overseas the operation of all agents under their charge in a host and 
have the ability to start, stop or send configuration commands to the agents. They do data 
reduction on the data received from the agents and report their results to one or more monitors. 
Monitors uses data from the entire network to perform higher level correlation and detect 
intrusions that involve several hosts. 
 
One of the advantages of AAFID is that it introduces modularity into the system. This is because 
agents are independent-running entities, which may be added to or removed from the system 
without affecting other components. It also limits the effects of a defective agent as the damage 
would be only limited to only one agent or a group of agents if it stops working. The use of a 
hierarchical structure in the IDS also enables data to be reduced and reported to upper layers, 
hence enhancing the scalability to the system. 
 
3.  Secure Agents for Network Vulnerability Scanning [7] 
 
A system for improving vulnerability assessment process was proposed through the use of 
mobile agents. A mobile agent is a program that represents a user in a computer network and can 
migrate autonomously from node to node to perform some task on behalf  on the user. It 
combines the advantages of both host-based and network-based scanning tools with the benefits 
of fast customization for detecting newly discovered vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 5: System overview of network 
 
The architecture of the system is shown in Fig. 5 and consists of agents, agent servers and agent 
coordinators. The agents are mobile detectors that migrate from host to host to detect 
vulnerabilities. Mobile agent servers provide the actual runtime environment on a host for 
visiting mobile agents. The agent coordinator is a centralized controller responsible for the 21   
creation and removal of mobile agents from the system. It also works in conjunction with 
individual agent servers to detect breaches in security in its agents.   
 
Vulnerability checks are done through  the roaming  agents,  which  follow a pre-determined 
itinerary that is established by the agent coordinator. The agent also carries a code that does the 
check and that is executed at the hosts it visits. Results obtained from the execution of the code 
on a host is saved as payload by the agent and passed to the agent coordinator for analysis on 
return. Feedback is then given to the system administrator through a graphical user interface. 
 
In the proposed system, security measures must be taken to ensure the safety of both the mobile 
agent and the host in which the agents execute their code. The security issues include: 
•  Protection of the confidentiality of an agent’s data and code 
•  Ensuring the integrity of the agent i.e. that the agent is not tampered with as it migrates 
from place to place 
•  Ensuring that agents are always available to do vulnerability checks 
•  Authentication of both agent server and agent to ensure that the right agent is visiting 
the right host 
 
 
4.  Micael [14] 
 
The Micael system is an intrusion detection system built upon AAFID. However, unlike AAFID 
where the agents are static, in Micael, the agents are mobile. The architecture of Micael is shown 
in Fig. 6 and consists of a Headquarter, Sentinels, Detachments, Auditors and Special agents.  
 
 
Fig 6: An example of Micael system for a network composed of three hosts. Each host runs a 
Sentinel Agent (S); Host A runs also a Detachment Agent (D); Host B runs an Auditor Agent; 
Host C also runs the Headquarter Agent (QG) 





The Headquarter (QG) is a special agent that centralizes the system’s control function. It is 
responsible for the creation of other agents and hence, maintaining a database of the agents’ 
executable code. Sentinels are agents that remain resident in each of the target network hosts and 
are responsible for collecting relevant information for the QG. When the Sentinels detect any 
anomalies in the hosts, it requests the creation of a Detachment from the QG. Detachments are 
agents that are specialized to deal with a particular anomaly and can take defense and counter-
attack measures against the hazard, if it is confirmed. 
 
Auditor agents are agents that are created by the QG to check the integrity of the active agents. If 
it detects that a Sentinel is missing, it requests the QG to recreate the appropriate Sentinel. In 
addition, the Auditor agent also has the ability to recreate the QG if for some reason, the QG was 
aborted. 
 
Micael utilizes the mobility of the agents to reduce the amount of resources required for ordinary 
operations but is able to concentrate the maximum amount of resources at the required place and 
time. For example, the ability to dispatch an Auditor agent to check the integrity of the agents 
make the allocation of an Auditory module on each Sentinel unnecessary and hence represents a 
savings in resources. In addition, in situations where  a Sentinel detects an anomaly, extra 
resources such as mobile Detachments may also be sent to the place where it is required. 
 
5.  Security Agent Based Distributed Authorization [19] 
 
The proposed system considers a security agent based approach to authorization in a distributed 
environment. A security agent (SA) is used to capture the privileges and part of the security 
policy on distributed authorization. Agent enabled hosts has a security management component 
(SMC) which is concerned with the security of the host and its execution environments. In 
addition, the collection of hosts that obey the same security policy are grouped together in a 
domain controlled by a Security Management Authority (SMA). The architecture is shown in Fig 
7. 










   











Client principals that wish to access certain hosts can insert code within the SA to perform the 
required tasks. The SAs are created at the client principal’s own SMC and has several elements 
containing information about the privileges of the principal, the validity of the privilege 
information as well as identity. It would also contain other information which it collects as it 
passes through other hosts. 
 
The request from the client principal is passed with the SA to the target. An Object Management 
(OM) element at the target interacts with the SMC to verify the client principal, the SA and to 
determine whether the request is to be granted or not. Since the SA is a full-fledged object 
(program and data) and has the ability to gather information relevant to its requests as it moves 
from host to host, it can use the collected information to make dynamic decisions on the behalf 
of the client principals.  
 
Several issues that are to be considered with regard to SAs are: 
•  That the SA should be unforgeable 
•  The SA should only have the capability to make those decision which it has been allowed 
to do and should not make any u nauthorized decisions and requests without being 
detected 
•  Methods of checking the integrity of the SA should be available to the target 
•  Methods to protect the agent from threats from the target should be available 
   - 
Table1: Comparison of Applications of Agents in Computer Security 
 
Projects  AAFID [1]  Secure Agents for 
Vulnerability Scanning  


































Collection of relevant information 
(sentinels) 
Countermeasures against 
unauthorized use (detachments) 
Checking on integrity of agents 
(Auditors) 
 
Intrusion detection and 
countermeasures against intrusion 
and unauthorized use 
 
To carry means of authentication 
To execute code it carries 


















Mobility of Agents  Immobile  Mobile  Mobile  Mobile 
Creation of Agents   Pre-created  Created on demand  Created on demand  Created on demand 
Measures of 
Effectiveness 
Ability to detect anomalies  Whether agents or data are 
susceptible to compromise 
Ability to customize agents for 
new vulnerability scans 
Ability to detect anomalies 
Effectiveness of reactions to intrusion 
and unauthorized use 
Effectiveness of authorization 
system 
Contribution towards dynamic 
decision making 
 
Costs  Monitors are single points 
of failure 
Provision of adequate security 
for mobile agents 
Costs in performance due to 
implementation of security 
features in agent  
 
Provision of adequate security for 
mobile agents 
 
Provision of adequate security 
for mobile agents 
Benefits  System Modularity 
Scalability of system 
Fast customization of agents for 
detection of new vulnerabilities 
Scalability of system 
Minimum use of resources due to 
specialization of agents 
Ability to dispatch the appropriate 
agents to handle hazards 
Easy reconfiguration of agents 
Scalability of system 
 
Supports the ability of agent to 
make dynamic decisions 
Allows the delegation and 
revocation of duties and 
privileges 
 